Value Ideas Blog
Microwave Vision, can you get a growing business for free? (Executive Write-Up)

Disclaimer: This is not an investment advice, please do your own research and don’t follow anyone blindly. Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that the author has a position in MicroWave Vision, so do affiliated parties. Thus they participate if the share price increases. Additionally, the author and related parties may sell their shares without further notice.


Nearly 2 years ago we stumbled for the first time upon the small French company Microwave Vision, since then we followed them closely and bought in at around 7 Euro per share. As we see the fair share price around 15 Euro which could now be reached due to the ongoing catalyst in form of a new CFO, we would like to share our thoughts  with you and are looking forward to your comments. (Ben from WertArt covered Microwave in April 2015 and bought in and sold out within the year, here you can find what he has written back than.)




Business Description

Microwave Vision (“MVG”) is a French company active in the niche market of antenna testing equipment (“AMS”).

The main segment AMS stands for 85% of Sales, 11,5% EBIT-Margin and is a decent business with a moat coming from high R&D spending (10% of Sales) in a small market niche (Total market size is around 320 Mio. USD) where MVG has more than double the size of its next competitor and with 30%, a high proportion of after sales. The products of MVG measure and display electromagnetic waves of all kinds of antennas. The equipment is used during all stages of a product’s life cycle, including product development, pre-production qualification, production testing and product maintenance. Typical companies using MVGs products are in the telecom, smartphone, satellite, automotive and aerospace/defence industry. Customers of MVG are Airbus, VW, Foxconn, Apple, Google and many more.

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Disclaimer: This is not an investment advice, please do your own research and don’t follow anyone blindly. Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that the author don’t have a position in Hargreaves but affiliated parties may have. Thus they participate if the share price increases. Additionally, the author and related parties may sell their shares without further notice.


We wrote about Hargreaves two times in the past, since then the stock price tanked another 50%. Here you can find the first and the second writeup about the company. In the meantime, we visited the company in the UK and more recently, Hargreaves published a trading update in which it basically revealed all cash which can potentially be realised within the next 5 years. After this update the share price rose ~20% within a couple of days.

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Disclaimer: This is not an investment advice, please do your own research and don’t follow anyone blindly. Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that the author and related parties are long-term shareholders of S&T AG for many years now. Thus they participate if the share price increases. Additionally, the author and related parties may sell their shares without further notice.


On March 30th 2016, S&T published their annual report 2015. You can find our old write-up here. Since than the share price is up nearly 50%. Back than we wrote:

If we put those two values together, we end up with a fair value of 7,68 Euro per share which doesn’t account for the potential of further revenue growth of the Security Appliances Segment which could get a really big project from Boeing (S&T already received money for a feasibility study and currently they are negotiating the contract with Boeing). If we factor in the growth of the appliances segment the fair value could easily reach 10 Euros per share, due to favorable economics.


Thus, I would like to present an update on my valuation and thoughts today. But lets start with the annual report. The revenue figures where already published before but now we also have the underlying Cash-Flow etc. the key highlights for me are:

  1. Operating Cashflow exceeds EBITA and Net Income by a wide margin and is up +29%
  2. EBITA increased by 23%
  3. EPS increased to 36 Cents (+12,5%), EPS before PPA rose to 42 Cents (+13,5%) vs. an increase of + 25,7% in Net Profit – This is not really nice as we had some dilution
  4. Order Backlog up to 181 Mio. (+ 16%) / Project Pipeline (Mainly Smart energy) up to 701 Mio. (+8,7%)
  5. Plan for 2016: Over 500 Mio. in revenues (Q4 2015: 165 Mio. / 468 Mio. FY 2015)
  6. Sold three pilots for an “End-to-End Smart-Metering Solution” to Electrica, Romania, which shows the good potential in Romania and Poland. According to my Knowledge, S&T is currently the only provider which is able to supply a one-stop solution like this in eastern Europe. Furthermore, if we look in the new tender documents, we can see, that they are on OSGP now. Which means that the Pilots where so good, that S&T now has nearly won the big tender as they are the only major player with OSGP and own the license!
  7. S&T invested 5,2% or 24,6 Mio. of their revenues into R&D. Of this 4 Mio. are for a big new Internet of Things security project which can be used in both, Secruity Appliances & Smart Energy but is fully charged on the Secruity Appliances segment. Which confirms, in my opinion, the margin potential of up to 20% in this segment.
  8. EBIT-Margins in the different segments:
    1. Service DACH: 0,25% vs. -0,7% in 2014
    2. Services EE: 2,4% vs. 3,3% in 2014
    3. Security Appliances: 11,74% vs. 11,84% in 2014
    4. Smart Energy -0,5% vs 0,4% in 2014
  9. Free Cash Flow of 17 Mio. in line with Net income


Another really interesting thing in my opinion was the option scheme, which you can find below. What astonished me was that every top-manager was rewarded with more options than the year before, despite one, Hannes Niederhasuer the CEO himself. When I have asked him about this fact, he told me, that he only has a certain amount of options which he can contribute among his employees and as he already owns enough shares and is incentivized enough he believes that it is better to give the options to his managers. This again underlines what a great CEO he is, remember he is paying himself only 450 Euro a month. He still holds more than 10% of all outstanding shares (5% directly and 5% via his family).





A further point of interest was the disposal of the international assets of NES (Smart Energy). Basically, S&T has sold the non strategical parts of NES which will reduce the revenues in the Smart Energy segment by 10 Mio. The new guidance is a revenue of 70 Mio. in 2016 ( +70% without NES US). Furthermore, the Smart Energy segment should be profitable for the first time as they can focus on the eastern European and  DACH-area. This refocus has already brought the Smart Energy segment to a breakeven in Q4 2015 and should yield in profits from 2016 onwards. Additionally,  an earn-out of 3 Mio. over the next 3 years exists. The Earn-out is based on the EBITDA-margin of the Smart Energy Segment of S&T. If they come over 5-6% EBIDTA Margins, S&T has to pay nothing. If they approach 15% they have to pay 3 Mio. over 4 years. Thus the disposal of the non-strategic NES segments make sense.


if we now look on my old valuation and update the numbers, the SOTP looks like this:

  1. Services is basically an IT-System house which generates 350 Mio. Euro revenue in 2016:
    1. 4% sustainable EBIT-Margin
    2. = ~14 Mio. EBIT
    3. * (1-tc(25%))
    4. = 10,5 Mio. OE
    5. Discount rate of 10%
    6. = ~105 Mio. Euro OE


  1. Security Appliances for niche markets generate 90 Mio. Euro revenue in 2016:
    1. 20% sustainable EBIT-Margin
    2. = ~18 Mio. EBIT
    3. * (1-tc(25%))
    4. = 13,5 Mio. OE
    5. Discount rate of 10%
    6. = 135 Mio. Euro OE


If we put those two segments together, we end up with a value, without any further growth, of 240 Mio. Euro + 9,4 Mio. Net Debt – 11 Mio. Minority interest = 238 Mio. Euro / 43,8 Mio. Shares outstanding = 5,44 Euro per share

  1. Smart-Energy Real Option:
    1. Detail period of 9 years where revenue grows from 65 to 235 and falls back to 90 Mio.
    2. 9% WACC in detail period
    3. 10% WACC afterwards
    4. 3% Perpetual growth rate after 2024
    5. Marginal Tax rate of 25%
      1. Sum of DFCFs = 60,7 Mio.
      2. PV of TV= 94,6 Mio.
    6. Firm Value = 155,4
    7. FV/43,8 Mio. Shares = 3,59 Euro per share

Thus the fair share price for S&T in 2016, according to my STOP valuation, is 9,03 EUR.


A further catalyst to realize the value should be the fact that they could enter into the TechDAX by September 2016. This is really important for S&T as Deutsche Bank and ETF will and can invest into S&T.  Furthermore, S&T had two roadshow in UK and it seems like S&T now gets a lot of attention from the investors there. Additionally, Warburg started to cover the stock as well which brings the number of analysts up to 3 now.  Another driver could be, that Berenberg could start to cover them soon, as they have a big conference  in Lisbon, where S&T will be presented as one of the best 25 European companies.


What I didn’t like was that S&T paid interest of 2,9 Mio. which is added to the Operating CashFlow which I typically don’t like as it inflates the Operating Cash-Flow! Furthermore, the Received Interest of 300k EUR is booked into Investment activities, which I find really strange. Than Paid interest is than subtracted in the Financing CashFlow. I have never seen something like this before… But I will find out what happend there…

Disclaimer: This is not an investment advice, please do your own research and don’t follow anyone blindly. Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that the author and related parties are long-term shareholders of S&T AG for many years and thus participate if the share price increases. Additionally, the author and related parties may sell their shares without further notice. As this post is already extremely long, I will write another one for the Smart-Energy business.


1. Executive Summary

1.1. Business

  S&T AG (‘SnT’) is an Austrian company active in three different markets.

  1. IT Consulting and System House
  2. Niche market Security Appliances
  3. Hardware & software products for Smart Energy

Today, the System house activity stands for over 80% of revenue and is used to cross sell S&Ts smart energy & security Appliances. In the system house division S&T offers IT and ERP implementation services but also outsources the whole IT-Infrastructure of customers. The regional scope of S&T is focused on Eastern Europe and Russia. Major clients are governments and big companies like Skoda and Mikros.

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Today we would like to provide further insides into our hidden Asset valuation of Hargreaves Services plc, where a friend of us, Daniel Gilcher helped us.   According to the annual report of 2014 the book value of land assets are carried at cost: 8,418m GBP. The problem is, that we don’t have a lot available information on the different land patches across the country nor the status and information of the plan projects.     Her is what we know: Where the old mines are and that 300 acres (1% of overall land) is developed towards a residential area. A minimum of 1600 housing units will be erected. The cost for development remains unknown. Please see below the landbank of Hargreaves around Edinburgh.   land portfolio around Edinburgh And in the next picture the landbank around Westfield. read more



vitec logo


Today, we want to introduce a company we found trough a stock screening process and which we found very interesting: The Vitec Software Group AB (STO:VIT-B) is a Swedish software designer specialized in comprehensive property and energy management systems for buildings, forecasting for energy companies (electricity, district heating and wind power), management systems for realtors and media distribution. Merely a warning in advance: historical annual reports are published exclusively in Swedish language, but the company has started to publish reports in English as well. That might also be the reason international investors start paying attention. We were already able to realize modest gains (we invested at about 135 SEK) but think there is still an upside. Some of you might remember that we pitched the idea in February at the EBS talk. Here is the full story.

 26.7 6.9 2.7  13.6 x  3.45 x  1.12%

Data: Bloomberg and own calculations, Website:


Live Stock Chart:

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Recently BPER announced a change in the CEO position of the Group and the CHF jumped after the Swiss National Bank abandoned the CHF/EUR exchange rate of 1,20. Ariane de Rothschild will replace Christoph de Backer, which served BPER for three years, on the 31.01.2015. You can read the full press statement here. You can find our initial analysis here which we think is still intact despite the fact, that the new exchange rate possible decreases the Net Profit a little bit.


Christoph de Backer was the head behind the ongoing transformation and strategic repositioning of BPER. As we have read some rumors in the newspaper, this transaction has not pleased everybody and some older employees have left the group. The change was quiet surprising for us and we already observed some recent changes in the last years and months which are probably a result of the coming change. For example a new position of a Deputy CEO was created and Sabine Rabald, who worked for the Group nearly 20 years, was announced to serve in this role. But If you read the annual statements of the past years the change is not that surprising as it looks at first. Benjamine de Rothschild mentioned several times that the lead of the group will be taken over by a women in the foreseeable future. As Ariane de Rothschild already served in different banks in New York and Paris and has an education which is focused on finance we  see the change not as a negative step towards the future.


Lately the Group announced the acquisition of an extra stack in OROX Asset Management which should strengthen the Property Funds business of Rothschild. The overall stack is now at 82% and the purchase price was not disclosed.


In our view the semiannual result of the group was quiet satisfying, the business profit which is the best proxy for the ongoing operations rose by 32,4 %. Sadly this growth was not seen in the Net Profit of the Group which dropped by 18,8% for the half year, due to the result in the extraordinary income, which was quiet high last year. The total Assets under Management in the Group rose slightly by 1% in the half year. This is not really impressive but is explainable with the sale of non-core businesses in Italy. The like-for-like AUM rose by 4%; way more in line with our expectations of the groups’ expansion into Asia. The Tier I ratio remained unchanged on 36,9% under Basel III which is a really comfortable buffer.

In the first part of our analysis we explained the business model of Delticom; now we would like to give you and inside in its valuation. But before we begin with the number crunching we would like to start with a short summary of the key takeaways of our first part:

  1. Some other Value-Investors think that the problems of Delticom are only short-term issues: EBIT-Margins will bounce back to their old highs.
  2. Delticom has a really light business model: everything is outsourced to third party distributors.
  3. No use of purchase power: Delticom uses a fixed premium on the purchase price of every tire, sometimes it uses a flexible mark up to account for seasonality and inventory management.
  4. No customer captivity due to long purchase cycles of over 4 years.
  5. No lock-in of fitting shops.
  6. BBE-Study assumes that the online market share will reach 15% in 5 years, e.g. 2020. In an overall saturated market. (You can see the development of 2014 here)
  7. Bad strategic behavior in the acquisition of Tirendo and bad own brand strategy (The tires get really bad reviews.)
  8. Too high ROCE and ROIC even with small EBIT-Margins, which we will explain in the hereafter

What do we mean with too high ROCE and ROIC, and why is the biggest advantage of Delticom also its weakest spot?

Many other investors think that Delticom is able to return to its old EBIT-Margins, but we don’t think so. Why? The answer lies in the Business Model of Delticom which is extremely asset-light. As you can see in the chart below, the Capital Employed of Delticom is 7,1 % of 2013 Revenues, relatively low in comparison to other companies, but for Delticom itself higher than in the year of 2006 (6,6%) and virtually sky-rocketed from its low in the year of 2010 (0,9%) where Delticom also has shown its highest EBIT margin (11,1%).  The combination of high EBIT-Margins and low Capital Employed lead to an astonishing high ROCE of 276% in the year of 2010. Furthermore the ROCE was still high (51%) in 2013 where Delticom only had a EBIT-Margin of 3,6% and a Capital Employed of 7,1% of revenue. This high ROCE’s is also the reason why this business is so attractive for every competitor, if you cannot defend your turf with a big moat. As we don’t think that Delticom has a moat, we think that every time the EBIT-margins are high enough new competitor will enter the game.

  CE Delticom   So let’s come to our valuation of Delticom.

We have explained already that we don’t think Delticom has a moat and is a pure execution business only, so we use a discount rate of 10%. If we discount our Earning Power Value, assume an EBIT-Margin of 4% in the future and subtract the debt of Delticom we end up with a fair value of 16,62 EUR per share. This is not far away from our current trading price of around 17,5 EUR and is in our opinion quiet low  for an evaluation without any future growth.


Delticom was able to growth its revenues by 17,7% p.a. over the last five years. If we now assume a growth of 8,8% in average over the next 5 years (10% in 2015 declining to 7% in 2018) which we think is quiet conservative, we end up with an N-EPV of 28 EUR per Share in the year of 2018 or an IRR of 13,7%. (Capital allocation is assumed to be stable: 43% dividends, 3% growth CAPEX, 2% change in NWC and no share repurchases.) If you than use the Growth Multiple of Greenwald to calculate the Terminal Value with a 3% growth rate, you end up with an N-EPV of 37,92 EUR per Share at the end of the year of 2018. Which is equal to an IRR of 20,1%.


We also used the approach of total Market size as an approximation but where not really satisfied with this approach. Therefore the reasonable share price of Delticom should be around 30 EUR which gives you a nice little upside. But if we think in our 3 pillars Model, we end up with a fair or cheap price but with neither a beautiful business, nor a management we would like to be engaged with. (You can inform yourself here and take a look at the insider trading)

 We wish all of you a happy new year! Disclosure: No Position

In our today’s report we feature an idea which was already mentioned many times by other value investors. However, our outcome is different in one point which leads to a completely different picture. Here you can find the analysis of Profitlich&Schmidlin and from others (We have to add that these two funds share one platform). We would like to present you our 3 cents on Delticom. The online tire store Delticom was often proclaimed to be a value investment. Besides its growth rate that was because it used to have a solid balance sheet, an easily understandable business model, and because its extremely high returns on equity.

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Today we have a look at the German company Jungheinrich. This report was accomplished with the help of my good friend Benedikt Balthasar, who is studying Math and is currently in his last Master semester at the TU Berlin. Furthermore we would like to excuse our long absence period, this is due to the mentioned fulltime internship of Felix in an investment bank and that I had currently moved to Nice.  

Company Overview

  33063-logo-pressemitteilung-jungheinrich-ag   The forerunner of the Jungheinrich Group was established by Hermann Jungheinrich in 1908 as an import and export firm under the name H. Jungheinrich & Co. In 1953 his eldest son, Friedrich Jungheinrich, laid the cornerstone for the present company by establishing H. Jungheinrich and Co. Maschinenfabrik. After the passing away of the founder, Jungheinrich remains an independent family business owned by the shareholder families Lange and Wolf. read more